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NATURALISM AND THE RESURRECTION: 
A REPLY TO GARY HABERMAS 
Stephen T. Davis 
This paper is a reply to Gary R. Habermas' article, "Knowing that Jesus' Resur-
rection Occurred: A Response to Stephen T. Davis" (Faith and Philosophy, Vol. 
II, No.3). His paper, as the title suggests, is a response to a paper of mine, 
viz. "Is It Possible To Know That Jesus Was Raised From the Dead?" (Faith 
and Philosophy, Vol. I, No.2). I would describe the differences between Haber-
mas' position and mine as important but not fundamental. He and I both believe 
that Jesus was genuinely raised from the dead, and both argue that belief in the 
resurrection is rational. The main difference is that Habermas thinks that 
naturalism can be refuted and that accordingly "the resurrection of Jesus is an 
event which can be known to be an historical fact," while I have serious doubts 
about both. (There is a sense in which I can affirm the second, but not using 
the word "know" as Habermas does.) 
I will make two main points in this paper, one about the biblical evidence for 
the resurrection and the other about the naturalist's rejection of the resurrection. 
However, let me first note that to a certain extent I am going to have to argue 
on behalf of viewpoints I don't myself hold. For example, I believe (pace 
Habermas) that naturalism is a rational position, and will so argue, but I am no 
naturalist. For another, I am going to argue (pace Habermas) that discrepancies 
in the biblical resurrection accounts can constitute an aspect of the naturalist's 
argument against the resurrection, but I myself hold that on the important matters 
the resurrection accounts speak with one voice. Thus since my arguments in this 
paper might be subject to misunderstanding, let me again make clear that I am 
a believer in the claims that Jesus was truly dead and three days later was bodily 
raised, and that such a belief is or at least can be rational. (Furthermore, it 
contributes only to misunderstanding when Habermas calls my position on the 
resurrection of Jesus "skeptical," as if I didn't believe it or wasn't sure whether 
to believe it or not.) 
What about the discrepancies in the accounts of the resurrection of Jesus in 
the New Testament? They do exist, and are noticed even by people like me who 
have a high regard for the authority and reliability of the Bible (several are listed 
in my earlier article). I am reluctant to lay great emphasis on this point, however, 
since as noted I believe that on the crucial points the resurrection accounts in 
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the gospels agree. For example, the empty tomb stories seem to me to say 
something like this: early on the first day of the week certain women, among 
them Mary Magdalene, went to the tomb; they found it empty; they met an angel 
or angels; and then were either told or else discovered (Mary Magdalene in the 
Fourth Gospel) that Jesus was alive. Accordingly, I am prepared to grant that 
some of the frequently noted discrepancies can be harmonized without great 
difficulty. But in the case of others--<lid the women keep silent or run to tell 
the disciples? were the disciples told to stay in Jerusalem or to go to Galilee? 
how are we to number and arrange the many distinct accounts of appearances 
of the risen Jesus?-I am not able to find sensible, non-foolish harmonizations. 
Habermas is right that the discrepancies can be ignored if we can deduce or 
in some sense prove the resurrection from facts all competent scholars agree on. 
Habermas thinks this can be done-in fact I think he believes he has done it in 
his The Resurrection of Jesus: An Apologetic (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker 
Book House, 1980). But I do not believe he or anyone else has done so. The 
universally accepted facts (roughly that Jesus was crucified and buried; that 
certain folk had experiences which they took to be encounters with the risen 
Jesus; that their belief in the resurrection of Jesus was the reason they so radically 
changed and was the heart of the message of the church they founded) are far 
too skimpy for that. Furthermore, if we could deduce the resurrection from these 
facts, they would no longer be universally agreed on. Habermas' attempt to rule 
out the discrepancies as irrelevant therefore fails. People who deny the resurrec-
tion can use the discrepancies to argue that the resurrection accounts are diverse, 
inconsistent, late, and unreliable. (This, for example, is exactly what Willi 
Marxsen does in The Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1976); see pp. 27,55,68, 75-76.) 
My main complaint against Habermas' way of arguing for the resurrection is 
that his response to the naturalist rejection of miracles is oversimplified. At 
heart, Habermas argues that if we are going to use proper inductive research 
methods we must be open-minded to all possibilities, that it is unscientific to 
make an a priori decision, before investigating the evidence, to exclude certain 
sorts of possible explanations of events, viz. miraculous ones. Now in the end, 
of course, I as a supernaturalist accept this argument. But Habermas' presentation 
of it seems to me too facile. It ignores the fact that the rationality of naturalism 
is based on the strong commitment of all rational human beings to give naturalistic 
explanations (i.e., explanations that do not involve violations of natural laws) 
of the phenomena we observe. 
Surely there are some possibilities to which we need not be open. For example, 
how about the possibility that President Kennedy was actually killed by a spy 
from the planet Tralfalmadore cleverly disguised as Oswald? Or how about the 
possibility that Napoleon Bonaparte is still alive (at the age of 216) and is hiding 
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in Paraguay? Now as a supernaturalist, I myself agree that if after careful exam-
ination we find that by far the best explanation of a given phenomenon is one 
that involves a miracle, we ought to swallow our reluctance and hold that a 
miracle occurred. By my point is that to a naturalist the idea that Jesus was 
raised from the dead is at least as ridiculous as the ridiculous possibilities men-
tioned above. The "we should be open-minded to all possibilities" argument in 
favor of miracles will not be convincing to such a person. 
Habermas' most important argument against naturalism and in favor of the 
resurrection runs roughly like this: 
1. There are certain facts surrounding the purported resurrection of 
Jesus that all scholars agree on. 
2. The known theories that deny that Jesus was raised from the dead 
fail to account for all these facts. 
3. The theory that Jesus was raised from the dead accounts for all these 
facts. 
4. Therefore, the only rational conclusion is that Jesus was raised from 
the dead. 
Now I agree that there are certain facts about the death of Jesus and afterwards 
that virtually all competent scholars accept; I agree that the nineteenth century 
rationalistic explanations of the resurrection all collapse of their own weight; 
and I agree that the resurrection of Jesus is the best explanation of the accepted 
facts. Nevertheless, Habermas' argument is invalid. There may be other 
naturalistic theories not discussed by Habermas or perhaps not even yet invented 
that account for the accepted facts. Or perhaps no resurrection occurred but we 
are simply too far removed in time from the events following the death of Jesus 
to know for sure what happened. 
Furthermore, even if Habermas' argument were valid it would not necessarily 
convince rational naturalists. Such persons, I suspect, would quickly begin 
denying some of the accepted facts, i.e., the facts would no longer be universally 
accepted. And I think this would be (or least could be, given the circumstances) 
a rational thing for them to do. (Similarly, if someone was clever enough to 
take certain facts I now accept and show me that they entail the nonexistence 
of God, I imagine I would quickly begin asking myself which of the facts to 
deny. My commitment to the existence of God would doubtless be stronger than 
my commitment to at least some of the facts.) 
Habermas accuses those naturalists who reject the resurrection despite the 
evidence in its favor of what he calls "a priori reasoning." But what exactly is 
a priori reasoning? I think by this term he means deciding on a conclusion before 
examining the evidence or even holding firmly to a conclusion despite over-
whelming evidence against it. He argues that rational people investigate the facts 
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and then on the basis of those facts reach a conclusion. And surely Habermas 
is right that a priori reasoning, understood in this sense, is something to be 
avoided. We should base our conclusions on the evidence available to us and 
even, whenever necessary, revise our conclusions in the light of contrary evi-
dence. 
But do naturalists who reject the claim that Jesus was raised from the dead 
commit the fallacy of a priori reasoning? Well, it is possible that they do, and 
perhaps some do; but this need not be the case. For one thing, these naturalists 
are guilty as charged only if the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus is very 
strong indeed-so strong, in fact, as to outweigh the commitment virtually all 
rational people have made to the notion that people dead for three days do not 
get up and walk around again. It seems to me perfectly possible for a naturalist 
to examine the relevant evidence objectively and carefully (and not just dismiss 
it a priori) and still decide that no miracle occurred. Such a person could say: 
"Yes, there is evidence for the resurrection; no, I don't know precisely what 
happened after the crucifixion; but whatever happened, since dead people stay 
dead it surely wasn't a resurrection." Such a person has not necessarily rejected 
or ignored the evidence, i.e., is not necessarily gUilty of a priori reasoning. 
For another, the relationship between theories and facts, between assumptions 
and evidence, between world views and experience, is far more complex than 
Habermas lets on in his recent article. Quine, Kuhn, and many other philosophers 
have devoted a great deal of effort to sorting out the complicated relationships 
between world views and confirming or conflicting evidence. Of course people 
do sometimes change their world views, sometimes because of evidence (typically 
it had better be pretty massive). There are naturalists who were once super-
naturalists and there are supernaturalists who were once naturalists. Now I am 
not a world view (or conceptual) relativist, so I think it is theoretically possible 
to demonstrate the superiority of one world view to another. Perhaps some day 
someone will refute the world view I have been calling naturalism. I just do not 
think anyone has yet done so. Naturalism remains a rational position. 
But how can I claim that naturalism is rational, Habermas asks, when I admit 
(in my earlier paper) that it is circular? Here, I think, Habermas has simply 
misinterpreted me. There is a kind of circularity in the neighborhood of our 
discussion, both for naturalists and supernaturalists. It can be described as follows: 
We can show (contrary to Hume and his contemporary allies) that miracles can 
occur; the real question is whether any have occurred; to settle that question we 
must obviously look to the evidence in human experience for and against purported 
miracle claims; but there is no such thing as bare, uninterpreted evidence or 
experience, and so the way one evaluates the evidence one sees depends to a 
great extent on one's world-view, i.e., on whether or not one thinks miracles 
are possible or probable. This is why certainly believers (e.g., Habermas) think 
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the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus overwhelming while certain nonbelievers 
(e.g., Flew) think it perfectly absurd to believe that a man dead for three days 
lived again. 
This is a sort of circularity, but is not an instance of committing the fallacy 
of circular reasoning. This fallacy is that of arguing, for example, that p is true 
because q is true and that q is true because p is true (although the fallacy is 
usually much more disguised than that). So is it irrational for a person to argue 
as follows: We know that J. S. Bach is a superior composer to Paul McCartney 
because cultured people prefer Bach to McCartney and we know that such people 
are cultured because they prefer Bach to McCartney. But some episodes of 
circularity are not irrational (i.e., are not viciously circular). Some are simply 
unavoidable. For example: We know that a logical person is in part one whose 
thought is' consistent with the laws of logic and we know that the laws of logic 
are authoritative in part because they agree with the thought of those persons 
we hold to be logical. 
Of course, a rational naturalist who faces overwhelming disconfirmation of 
that world view must give it up (just as must a rational supernaturalist who faces 
overwhelming disconfirmation of that world view). But until the time is ripe for 
that sort of paradigm shift, it is rational for such people to interpret their experience 
in terms of their world view. That is why I insist that naturalism (a position I 
do not hold) is a rational position: the evidence (even evidence for the resurrection 
of Jesus) is nowhere near strong enough rationally to require its rejection. I 
frankly regard the claim that it is as a bit of apologetic bravado. 
But how can I criticize Hume's rejection of miracles, Habermas asks, given 
my position that naturalists can rationally reject the resurrection? That is, I first 
argue against Hume, who in effect says that no amount of evidence in support 
of a given purported miracle will allow rational belief in that miracle. But then 
on behalf of naturalists I go on to argue that it can be rational to reject the 
resurrection of Jesus, despite the evidence in its favor, because "dead people 
stay dead." Is this not inconsistent? Not at all. I say that naturalists can rationally 
reject the resurrection of Jesus on the basis of the presently existing evidence. 
Obviously, I wouldn't say they can rationally reject it on the basis of any possible 
configuration of evidence. In fact, I believe that in the eschaton it will be perfectly 
obvious to all rational observers that Jesus is and was alive, i.e., that he really 
was raised from the dead. Naturalism, then, will no longer be a viable position. 
In my previous paper I distinguished between two sorts of apologetic argu-
ments. A soft apologetic argument attempts to demonstrate the rationality of 
accepting the Christian position. A hard apologetic argument attempts to 
demonstrate the irrationality of rejecting the Christian position. Typically the 
first sort of argument claims that an intellectually acceptable explanation of some 
phenomenon x is some claim y, while the second sort of argument claims that 
308 Stephen T. Davis 
the only intellectually acceptable explanation of x is y. (The variable x often 
stands for something like "The world has certain properties" or "History contains 
certain events" or "I have had certain experiences"; y is often something like 
"God exists" or "The Christian God exists" or "God raised Jesus from the dead.") 
The deepest difference between Habermas and me is now clear-he is an advocate 
of hard apologetics and I am an advocate of soft apologetics. 
Now both Habermas and I have as one of the aims of our writings on the 
resurrection of Jesus that people come to believe that it really happened. We are 
both arguing, in effect, for a sort of conversion. And it must be granted that 
hard apologetic arguments, if they succeed, are better (though not infallible) 
vehicles for producing conversions than soft apologetic arguments. My point, 
however, is that I am not aware of any successful hard apologetic argument-
Habermas' or anybody else's. Is there any general or theoretical or (I hesitate 
to use the term) a priori reason why hard apologetic arguments fail? I do not 
know. Perhaps God is just too hidden and mysterious. Perhaps God wants to 
preserve out intellectual freedom. Perhaps people are too blinded by sin. Perhaps 
Christian apologists just aren't clever enough. 
Soft apologetic arguments will probably produce few conversions. (The idea 
is not impossible, however-perhaps some people will be converted merely by 
coming to see that the Christian position is rational, even if they do not also see 
that unbelief is irrational.) In general people who advocate soft apologetics will 
look elsewhere than philosophy for the efficient production of conversions-
perhaps they will look to preaching or to prayer, for example. The main aim of 
such apologists, then, is not producing converts, so if that occurs it will be a 
kind of serendipitous accident. It is to show those inside and outside the circle 
of faith, both fellow believers and objecting nonbelievers, that Christianity is 
intellectually tenable. 
Claremont McKenna College 
